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Patterns of judicial decision-making: An analysis of
Supreme Court cases
SASHEEJ HEGDE

1. Introduction
Notwithstanding the implicit biases associated with their reporting, the cases
reported in law journals provide a set of sociological data which is useful in theorising
on the operation of the legal system. In this paper, we shall analyse such data on the
cases decided by the Suprem~ Court of India and reported in The Supreme Court
Cases.l The analysis attemvted here is not intended to make predictions about the
behaviour of the Supreme Court, but only to indicate some dimensions of the
decision-making by the Indian Supreme Court. Also, the analysis briefly addresses the
question of the nature of the judicial process. Although the issues tackled may seem
incomplete and/or obvious, it is hoped that this analysis sufficiently documents details
about the Supreme Court's functioning that have escaped critical attention especially
in legal circles.
The data presented here relate to 1254 cases decided by the Supreme Court of
India. They come from two volumes each of TIle Supreme Court Cases, selected at
random for four years - 1970 (349 cases), 1976 (336 cases), 1980 (353 cases) and
1985 (216 cases). The analysis of these cases has to do with such matters as the central
issues involved, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court invoked (that is, original or
appellate), the parties involved and the outcome of the case, the source of the appeal,
the "fate" of the appeal (that is, from the High Court to the Supreme Court), the "fate"
of the case (that is, from the lower court to the High Court to the Supreme Court),
the time taken for deciding the case, both by the Supreme Court <\ndthe High Court,
and the patterns of consent and dissent in the judgments of the Supreme Court.

2. Issues, jurisdiction and sources of appeal
We will begin with the issues around which the cases revolve and the nature of
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court invoked. Often a given case involves a plurality
of issues which can be subsumed under more than one category. Thus, for instance,
cases pertaining to education, transport, taxation, etc. may also involve questions
relating to the actions of public officials. Likewise, constitutional questions may be
implied in many of the issues taken up to the Supreme Court. To preclude any
1.

The Supreme COlin Cases is published by the Eastern Book Company, Lucknow, ,since 1969. Many
of the lawyers and the judges whom we consulted affirmed the reliahility and utility of Ihe journal,
both-as an authoritative aid to professional practice and as a source of knowledge about the
functiJ!)ningof the Supreme Court.
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confusion that may arise as a consequence

of this, we have uniformly considered

the

key bone of contention in a particular case and dclineate,d the issue therefrom.
Criminal offences (23.6%) and taxation matters (16.8%) dominate the cases
examined. Issues connected with tenancy, land and property (11.9%), service (9.4%)
and litigation challenging government/bureaucratic
action (6.3%) also stand out.
While the cases reported in 1970 and 1976 show the dominance of such issues as
criminal offences, taxation and tenancy, land and property \in this order), cases
relating to taxation (25.5%) seem to be a liule more than criminal offences (23.8%) in
1980. However, in 1985, service matters (21.3%) dominate the cases, followed by
criminal offences (14.8%) and taxation (11.6%).
It must be clarified that the dominance of criminal offences in the cases
examined does not suggest that the Supreme Court is pre-occupied by criminal
matters. Such issues as criminal offences, preventive detention, contempt of court and
maintenance involve the provisions of the criminal law and criminal procedure, while
the rest of the issues relate primarily to matters of civil law and civil procedure. The
latter comprise an overwhelming 909 or 72.5 per cent of the 1254 cases analysed, and
the former 345 or 27.5 per cent of the cases examined. This is obvious, as the matters
relating to civil law cover the widest range of human activity.
The invocation of the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is also borne
out by the analysis. An overwhelming 87.3 per cent of the cases constitute appeals
from the High Courts and other quasi-judicial forums. The few speciallcave petitions
decided by the Supreme Court (1.9%) are, in essence, also appeals from the High
Court. The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has been invoked in only 10.5
per cent of the examined cases; a mere 4 cases (0.3%) are review petitions filed
before the Supreme Court. Further, the invocation of the original jurisdiction chiefly
concerns cases relating to preventive detention and constitutional issues. Thus, of the
20 cases involving constitutional issues, 17 are original suits and 29 out of the 39 cases
relating to preventive detention are original suits. To a certain extent, service maUers
also seem to reveal an increasing resort to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, as could be inferred from the fact that 32 out of the 118 service cases are
original suits. Also, 14 out of the 79 cases challenging government/bureaucratic
actions are original suits. The predominance of appeals to the Supreme Court bears
ample testimony to the instrumental use of the legal system. The imperative of an
appeal to a higher court in an individual instance notwithstanding, the data presented
above are sufficient to demonstrate that the mobilisation of the legal system is done
chiefly for instrumental purposes. Recourse to the Supreme Court seems to be
primarily intended to rectify what are perceived by the parties concerned as an
infringement of their rights or damage to their interests.
TQe invocation of the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court comes
primarily in the form of appeals against the verdicts of the High Courts. Obviously,
the appeals decided by the SupreIl!.e Court are bound to largely reflect the pattern of
cases before the High Courts.

The major sources of the appeals decided
Allahabad

High Court (12.9%),

by

the Supreme Court are the

the Kerala High Court (12.6%),

the Punjab

and
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Haryana High Court (11.7%) and the Bombay High Court (10.5%). These are
followed by appeals from the Patna High Court (S.9%), the Delhi High Court (5.5%),
the Madhya Pradesh High Court (5.3%), the Karnataka High Court (4.9%), th~
Madras High Court (4.9%), the Andhra Pradesh High Court (4.7%) and the
Calcutta High Court (4.7%). A few appeals (3.7%) are from forums other than the
High Courts, such as the industrial tribunals, the tax tribunals, the disciplinary
committee of the Bar Council of India, the Judicial Commissioner's Court in some
Union Territories, etc. Of the appeals from the Allahabad, Punjab and Haryana and
Bombay High Courts, criminal offences predominate, followed by matters relating to
taxation and tenancy, land and property. However, the appeals from the Kerala High
Court show the dominance of issues connected with taxation and tenancy, land and
property, followed by appeals challenging governmentfbureau-cratic actions.
Over 55 per cent of the appeals relating to taxation are from the Allahabad,
Punjab and Haryana, Calcutta and Kerala High Courts. Nearly 60 per cent of the
appeals concerned with labour and industrial law are from industrial tribunals and the
Bombay High Court. Fifty per cent of the appeals relating to service are from the
High Courts of Punjab and Haryana, Allahabad, Karnataka and, Madhya Pradesh.
Likewise, over 70 per cent of the cases relating to house rent and eviction are appeals
from the Delhi, Madras, Allahabad, Bombay and Calcutta High Courts. Over 60 per
cent of the contract and money suits are appeals from the Allahabad, Kerala, Madhya
. Pradesh, Madras and Rajasthan High Courts. Over 65 per cent 0f the appeals relating
to government/bureaucratic actions are from the High Courts of Kerala, Bombay,
Allahabad, Andhra Pradesh and Punjab and Haryana. Finally, with regard to the
appeals concerning succession and partition, over 55 per cent are from the Allahabad,
Madras and Patna High Courts.

3. Appellants/Petitioners,

respondents and the outcome of cases

Having familiarized ourselves with the sources of the appeals brought to the
Supreme Court, as also the issues decided, we will now turn to a consideration of the
parties or the disputants involved in the cases analysed and the extent of success
achieved by them. It can be seen from Table 1 that in a majority of the cases, the
appellant/petitioner was either an individual or a group of individuals (61.1%).2 The
State and Central Governments were appellants/petitioners in 15.1 per cent and 7.6
per cent of the cases, respectively. Also, 13 per cent of the cases involved a company
or a firm as the appellant/petitioner. A private body such as a trade union, trust, cooperative society, hospital, school, etc. was an appellant/petitioner in just 3.2 per cent
of the cases.
Alternatively, with regard to the respondents in the cases decided by the
Supreme Court, the State Government was a respondent in 43.5 per cent of the cases
and the Central Government in 10.5 per cent of the cases. About 35 per cent of the
cases had an indiVidualor a group of individuals as the respondent. Likewise, 8.8 per
cent of the cases involved a company or a firm as the respondent, while only 2.1 per
cent had a private body as the respondent.
2.

The precise social location of these individuals could not be inferred from the reported cases.
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TABLE 1: APPELLANTS/PETITIONERS,
OUTCOME OF CASES
J3..ESPONDENTS AND THE
111
2440
15
532
558
1206
6-.
395
28
1221
124
545
2508
227
274
1254
132
26
66
43.
34315
73S
309
13
5243
86
689
75(9.1)
73
31
116
(45.3)
(M.8)
(45.9)
(10.9)
(8.8)
(51.1)
(53.7)
(375)
(435)
(45.3)
(29.3)
(56.7)
(50)
(2.1)
(46.3)
(41.1)
(48.1)
(55.2)
(42~4)
(45.3)
(2.6)
(10-.5)
(35.1)
(55.3)

337 1254 (61.1)
163
190
95
401
766
(54.9)

-

--mr-

Key: 1 - Appearances as appellant/petitioner; 2 - Favourable verdict as appellant/petitioner; 3 - Appearances as respondent; 4 - Pavoutable verdict as respondent; 5 - Total appearances as
appellant/petitioner and respondent; 6 - Total favourable verdict as appellant/petitioner and
respondent; 7 - refers to those cases which are disposed off or ordered accordingly following a
compromise between the parties and suitable directions from the Supreme Court. It also
includes those cases which have not been finally decided although preliminary directions have
been given by the Supreme Court.
Note:

Figures in brackets in columns 1, 3 and 5 represent column-wise percentages. Figures in brackets
in columns 2, 4 and 6 represent the rate of success (in terms of percentages) achieved by a
disputant in relation to their appearance as appellant/petitioner and/or as respondent.

This description of the appellants/petitioners
and respondents involved in the
cases is sufficient to indicate that most of the disputes brought to the Supreme Court
are between individuals or groups of individuals on the one hand and the government
on the other. Thus, while 48.1 per cent of the cases involved and individual or a group
of individuals either as appellants/petitioners
or as respondents, 29.3 per cent and 9.1
per cent of the cases had the State and Central Government respectively either as
appellants/petitioners
or as respondents. Also, companies or firm constitute an
important party who approach the Supreme Court (10.9%).
With reference to the outcome of a case or the success achieved by the various
disputants, it can be seen from Table 1 that while the State Government and the
Central Government were successful in 53.7 per cent and 51.1 per cent, respectively-of
the cases they figured in, an individual or a group of individuals were successful in
46.3 per cent of the cases they were involved. The companies or firms were successful
in 45.3 per cent of their cases. Further, the success recorded by the various parties was
more in their capacity as respondents than as appellants/petitionc:rs.
Thus, the State
Government was successful in 56.7 per cent of the cases in which it was a respondent
and 45.3 per cent in which it was an appellant/petitioner.
Likewise, individuals or
groups of individuals were successful in 55.2 per cent of the cases in which they were
involved as respondents and 41.1 per cent as appellants/petitioners.
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Apparently, the data contained in Table 1 amplifies the balancing function
discharged by the Supreme Court, which strives to strike a balance between the
claims of individuals, groups and organisations and the responsibilities of public
administration by the government and the bureaucracy. However, they are also
indicative of a general tendency on the part of the Supreme Court to decid~ in
favour of the government. This tendency is corroborated later in our analysis.
Further, the Table shows that while 54.9 per cent of the cases analysed have
resulted in a favourable verdict to the respondent, an equally significant 42.4 per cent
of the cases have culminated in favour of the appellant/petitioner. This fact of a large
number of appellants emerging successful necessarily carries within itself an implicit
criticism of the decisions of the High Court. This will become much clearer when we
consider the "fate" of the appeals before the Supreme Court.
Table 2 elaborates some of the inferences drawn from Table 1. We noted that in
43.5 per cent of the cases examined, the State Government was a respondent. It can
be seen from Table 2 that the issues over which the State Government has been
drawn to court as respondent involve chiefly criminal offences and matters relating to
taxation, tenancy, land and property, service and government/bureaucratic actions.
The State Government has been an appellant/petitioner mainly in such issues as
criminal offences, government/bureaucratic action, service, taxation and tenancy, land
and property. Likewise, the Central Government has been an appellant/petitioner in
such issues as taxation and service, and a respondent in such issues as taxation,
service, preventive detention and government/bureaucratic actions. Individuals or
groups of individuals have been, involved as appellants/petitioners chiefly in such
issues as criminal offences, tenancy, land and property, service, taxation, house rent
and eviction, election, succession and partition, preventive detention and
government/bureaucratic actions. As respondents, individuals or groups of individuals
have been involved ill such issues as tenancy, land and property, criminal offences,
service, house rent and eviction, election, succession and partition and taxation.
Companies or firms have been involved as appellants/petitioners in issues connected
with taxation, labour and industrial law and government/bureaucratic actions, and as
respondents in issues involving taxation, government/bureaucratic actions, labour and
industrial law and company law.
The success achieved by the various disputants in terms of the issues over which
they had been to the Supreme Court are also shown in Taole 2. While individuals or
groups of individuals were successful in 52.1 per cent of the cases relating to criminal
offences in which they were involved, the State Government was successful in 46.9 per
cent of these cases in which it was involved. With reference to the cases concerning
taxation, the State Government was successful in 63.8 per cent of these cases in which
it was involved, while companies or firms were successful in 52 per cent of these cases;
the Central Government was successful in 42.1 per cent of the cases relating to
taxation in which it was involved, and individuals or groups of individuals were
successful in 30.1 per cent of these cases in which they were involved.

-3-

----528150
5211
I::l
10
8I::ll:::::~
12
22
4928
46(100)
610
11
14
109
91
13
107
199
102
116
16
8240
27
41
15666
32
95
11
7735395
67
24
20
112
17
107
928(33.3)
63(50)
2326
227
73
73
86
116
1
45
10
25
90
34
17
625
71
13
6274311Central
545
309
190
124544
StateGovernment
Government
39
911
(12.5)
(71.4)
(83.3)
(75)
(90.9)
(37.5)
(51.3)
(63.8)
57
75374
(20)
(70)
(45.5)
(63.3)
C"
11
23
36
114
6132
271
(100).
(62.5)
(84.6)
(42.9)
(57.5)
(62.5)
(42.1)
(30)
(56)
(53.7)
127
(46.9)TABLE
15240
23,43
(100)
(18.2)
~4i:i
APPELLANTS/PETITIONERS,
RESPONDENTS AND THE
8 OUTCOME
~ §. 2:95
Maintenance
Education
OF CASES (ISSUE-WISE CLASSIFICATION)
Total

1

•..•.

t"-<

~
;::
-----§
'"
- ~
;:::
f;
231339
311
41313--(52.1)
11
12
442
21
20
39
10
119
23
35
31
26
187
29
14
117
167
238
73
5440
1964
8315
33
45
85
711
676
127
35
50
17
14
636
859(100)
364
61(50)
7(70)
23
48V:l
271- 3 8~I::(27.3)
19
15
1206
6628
243
24
28
10
15
13
558
.Q,
40
;:,
.j::.
138
22
4342
(44.4)
(30.1)
17
12
15
16
311
78
764550
926
(75)
(37.5)
(58.3)
(54.5)
(52.2)
(48.4)
(41)
(47.4)
(45.5)
(20)
(50)
(49.4)
(55.2)
(48.6)·
(41.7)
(42)
162
;:,
(20)
(46.7)
Disputants
~
~1:;'
~
<'l

•....•

•....•

766 247
123
40
38
29
69
15
25
18
79561- Individual/a
47
12

<I>

body
group ofPrivate
individuals

--t;
-- ::to
-9
-\:l
22126
10
1\:l118
1t'-<
I-" 10
221
1 (50.3)
36
20
274
125
18
10
111
934139
73
8(100)
12421- 11
20
13
11
32
39
1 149
1254
1254
532
689163
758247651
9(44.4)
149
340
10
79
39
16
18
979
14
962351154
49
118
54
21
.~
40
49
1337
6364
(54.5)
3
~.l.%
~
14
8
(37.5)
(33.3)
(61.5)
(40)
(16.7)
(77.8)
(38.5)
(60)
2%
146
(49.3)86
20
4
27
13
15
5
4
65
44
5
1
9
(57.1)
(SO)
(55.6)
(22.2)
(65)
(36.n
(10)
(25)
(46.9)
(55.1)
(46.8)
(90)
(51.3)
(75)
(36.4)
(52)
(29.5)
(30.5)
210
149
105
140
(66.7)
(70.5)
24
12
(30.8)
(61.5)
Disputants
30
21
11
10
19
17
60
53
(31.3)
(55.6)
(68.7)
(42.9)
(35.2)
(43.6)
(50.8)
(44.9)
~
§ !::
~

1

C>
C>

- -

Grand
total - and firm
Company

9
39
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Note:

As in Table 1.
Figures in brackets
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While the State Government was successful in 63.3 per cent of the tenancy, land
and property cases in which it was involved,~jndividuals or groups of individuals were
successful in 41.7 per cent of these cases. So also, in matters, relating to service, while.
the Central Government was successful in 57.5 per cent of the cases in which it was
involved and the State Government in 53.7 per cent of these cases, individuals or
groups of individuals were successful in 42 per cent of the service cases in which they
were involved. Thus, Table 2 further corroborates the te;tdency on the part of the
Supreme Court to decide in favour of the government, either Central or State, to
which we have made a reference.
The Table also reveals that respondents
were more successful than
appellants/petitioners
in cases relating to election, procedural
issues, taxation,
tenancy, land and property, compensation, hereditary privileges, constitutional issues,
revenue, injunction, contempt of court and succession and partition. But what is
perhaps more signilicant is that appellants/petitioners
came out more successful than
respondents in a number of cases, such as those relating to labour and industrial law,
service, house rent and eviction, contract arid money suits, criminal offences, preventive
detention, education, transport, matrimonial and maintenance. These findings are
also illustrative of the instrumental purposes for which the legal system is mobilized.

4. "Fate" of appeal
It has been noted earlier that an overwhelming majority of the cases decided by
the Supreme Court are appeals (87.3%) and special leave petitions (1.9%) from the
High Courts and other quasi-judicial forums. We shall now consider whether the
decision of the High Coure has been upheld or rejected by the Supreme Court in
various appeals. The "fate" of the appeals decided by the Supreme Court in terms of
various High Courts and in terms of the issues around which they revolve are analysed
below.
A majority of the appeals decided by the Supreme Court (53.7%) have upheld
the verdict of the High Courts. What is more striking, however, is that 33.3 per cent of
the appeals decided by the Supreme Court have rejected the verdict of the High Court.
Further, in a few cases, the appeals have been remallded back to thel court concerned
with suitable guidelines from the Supreme Court (6.2%) or partly allowed (4.2%),
where the Supreme Court rejects som~ of the contentions of the High Court, or
dismissed with modificatiolls in the terms of the verdict (1.3%), where the Supreme
Court upholds the verdict of the High Court but modifies the terms of the verdict,
either by bringing the dispute under some other prO\ision of the law or modifies a
sentence given by the High Court.
From the point of view of particular High Courts, while 50.7 per cent of the
appeals from the Allahabad High Court have been dismissed by the Supreme Court
3.

This is not to imply that the "fate" of the appeals from quasi-judicial forums have not been
analysed. However. since an overwhelming majority of the appeals are from the various High
Courts we have refrained from making a separate ref~r~n'~ 10 i1p~i1I~ from quasi-judicial forums.
Thus. in speaking of the "fate" of appeals from the High Court to the Supreme Court. these other
forums have been subsumed under the expression "'Iigh Court·.
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(in other words, the Supreme Court has accepted the verdict of the Allahabad High
Court), 33.3 per cent of the appeals have been allowed (in other words, the decision
ofthe Allahabad High Court has been set aside). Similarly, appeals from other quasijudicial forums have been dismissed (34.1%) or allowed (31.7%) by the Supreme Court.
With the exception of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, all other High Courts
have ,had a majority of their verdicts supported by the Supreme Court. While this may,
in itself, be important, what is perhaps much more striking is that a large number of
the decisions made by the various High Courts have been rejected by the Supreme
Court. This necessarily implies an explicit criticism of the decisions rendered by the
High Court, and has implications for the rule of law.
In terms of the issues around which the appeals revolve, the Supreme Court has
endorsed more High Court verdicts than repudiated them in respect of appeals
involving such issues as labour and industrial law, election, procedural issues,
company law, taxation, tenancy, land and property, compensation, criminal offences,
hereditary privileges, constitutional issues, revenue, injunction, contempt of court and
succession and partition. Among these, it can be noted that with regard to such issues
as election, contract and money suits, taxation, tenancy, land and property, revenue
and succession and partition the Supreme Court has a pronounced tendency to
. uphold the verdict of the High Court.
It is quite significant to note that in such issues as taxation, tenancy, land and
property and revenue, where the Supreme Court has shown a pronounced tendency to
support the High Court, the respondents have been chiefly the Central and/or State
Government (see Table 2). This necessarily implies a decision in favour of the
government. Even in respect of criminal offences where the State Government has
been a major respondent (see Table 2), it can be noted that in a majority of the
appeals the decision given by the High Court has been upheld by the Supreme Court.
Alternatively, where issues relating to services, house rent and eviction,
government/bureaucratic actions, preventive detention, education, transport and
matrimonial issues are concerned, the Supreme Court has tended to set aside the
verdict of the High Court. It is true that the Central and State Government have been
major respondents in such issues as service and government/bureaucratic actions (see
Table 2) and, thus, are bound to be affected by the Supreme Court repudiating the
High Court verdict. But it is also important to note that where these issues of service
and government/bureaucratic actions are concerned, the Central and State
Government, especially the latter, have been major appellants. (see Table 2)
Consequently, the fact that the Supreme Court has set aside the High Court verdict is
constitutive of a decision in favour of the government.

5. "Fate" of case
In the foregoing section, it was attempted to examine what happens to the
appeals that are made to the Supreme Court against the judgments of the High
Courts. It is also possible to examine the "fate" of a case as it moves from a lower
court to the High Court and finally to the Supreme Court. The reference here is not
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to those cases where the party concerned approached the High Court directly,
avoiding the lower dourts, but to those cases which, having had their origins in the
lower courts, moved to the High Court and then to the Supreme Court, where it was
finally disposed off. Table 3 shows the "fate" of 524 such cases in terms of the issues
around which they revolve.
)

TABLE 3: FATE OF CASE IN TERMS

3

2

Issues
Labour and industrial law
Service
House rent and
eviction
Election
Procedural
issues
Contract and

7 (31.8)
2 (22.2)

1 (ILl)

15 (31.9)

14 (29.8)

2 (9.1)

3 (13.6)

OF ISSUES
4

5

DNA

22
9

10 (455)
5 (55.6)

1 (ILl)

6 (12.8)

9 (19.1)

1 (2.1)

1 (20)

1 (20)

Total

2 (4.3)
1 (100)

47

3 (60)

5

1

money suits
Company law
Taxation

4 (14.8)
4 (26.7)
7 (77.8)

9 (33.3)
5 (33.3)
1(11.1)

8 (29.6)
2 (13.3)

5 (18.6)
3 (20)
1 (11.1)

1 (3.7)
1 (6.7)

27
15
9

Tenancy, land
& property
Compensation
Criminal

22 (38.6)
2 (33.2)

5 (8.8)
1 (16.7)

19 (33.3)
1 (16.7)

8 (14)
1 (16.7)

3 (5.3)
1 (16.7)

57

85 (31.5)

34 (12.6)

61 (22.6)

67 (24.8)

14 (5.2)

2 (50)

1 (25)

offences
Government/bureaucratic
actions
Hereditary
privileges
Constitutional
issues
Preventive
detention
Revenue
Injunction
Contempt of
court
Succession and
partition
Education
Transport
Matrimonial
Maintenance
Total
Key:

1 Uniformity;
available.

3 (42.9)

6
9 (3.3)

270

1 (25)

4

3 (42.9)

1 (14.2)

7

13 (34.2)

2 (5.3)

1 (100)

1 (100)

10 (26.3)

10 (26.3)

1 (25)

2 (5.3)

1 (2.6)

38
4

3 (75)
1 (100)

166 (31.7)
2 - Restoration;

Note: Figures in brackets represent

83 (15.8)

117 (22.3)

3 - Affirmation;

4 -

118 (22.5)
Rejection;

24 (4.6)
5 - Disjuncture;

16 (3.1)

524

DNA - Data not

row-wise percentages.

Ignoring minor variations, it is possible to discern five broad patterns in the
decisions rendered by the Supreme Court:

(a) Ullifonnity.- This refers to those decisions where the verdict pronounced
by the lower court has been supported both by the High Court and the Supreme
Court. For example, the lower court, in a house rent and eviCtion_casebetweenA,
the landlord, and B, the tenant, may decide in favour of the fotmer; the latter goes
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in appeal to the High Court, which supports the decision of the lower court. The
tenant's 'recourse to the Supreme Court also meets with the same fate, and thus
uniformity is maintained at all the three levels of the court. In 31.7 per cent of the
cases there has been uniformity in the decision given by the three levels of court.
(b) Rejection.-This refers to those decisions in which the Supreme Court has
rejected the verdict of the High Court and the lower court, who were in agreement,
and proceeded to render a verdict which is different from these two courts. For
example, in a property dispute between A and B, the lower court may decide in favour
of A, and thi~ is confrrmed by the High Court; however, the Supreme Court rejects
the decision given by these two courts and renders a verdict in favour of B. In 22.5 per
cent of the cases, the Supreme Court has rejected1Iie stand taken by the High Court
and the lower court.
(c) Affinnation.- This refers to those instances where the High Court has set aside
the verdict of the lower court and its (High Court) decision has been affirmed by the
Supreme Court. For instance, in a dispute over partition of family property between
two brothers, A and B, the lower court decides iafavour of B. In appeal, however, the
High Court sets aside the lower court verdict and decides in favour of A, and this
decision is also confrrmed by the Supreme Court. In 22.3 per cent of the cases, the
Supreme Court has affrrmed the decision of the High Court.
(d) Restoration.- This refers to those ~es where the High Court has set aside the
verdict of the lower court, but the Supreme Court,jn setting aside the verdict of the
High Court, restores the verdict of the lower court. For instance, the accused, A, in a
sessions case may be convicted by the lower court. However, in appeal to the High
Court, A's conviction may be set aside and an order of acquittal pronounced. The
government appeals to the Supreme Court, against the acquittal of A, and the
Supreme Court, while rejecting the High Court verdict, restores the order of
conviction delivered by the lower court. In 15.8 per cent of the cases, the Supreme
Court has restored the verdict of the lower court.
(e) Disjuncture.- This refers to those cases where the verdict given by the three
courts, namely, the lower court, the High Court and the Supreme Court, shows a lot
of divergence. For example, in a criminal case, the lower court may convict thre«
persons, namely, A, B and C; the High Court, while upholding the conviction of B and
C, may acquit A; and the Supreme Court may acquit C while upholding the Conviction
of B. Likewise, in a partition suit or a. property dispute, there could be many
individuals involved as well as many points in issue. Consequently; the verdict of the
lower court may be partly set aside by the High Court; in appeal, the Supreme Court
may partly set aside the verdict of the High Court and proceed to modify the d~cree
in favour of the appellants. Such disjunctures are seen in a few cases (4.6%).
These broad patterns of decision-making by the Supreme Court necessarily
imply that there is more to dispute resolution by courts than merely applying the law
to a case. With specific reference to the ~sues around which these cases revolve. it can
be seen from Table 3 that 38.6 per cent of the cases relating to-tenancy, .land and
property, 31.9 per cent of the cases relating tei house rent and eviction and 31.5 per
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cent of the cases involving criminal offences have resulted in verdicts that confirm the
decision of the lower court and High Court (that is, uniformity). On the other hand,
24.8 per cent of the criminal offences, 19.1 per cent of the house rent and eviction
cases, 18.6 per cent of the contract and money suits and 14 per cent of the tenancy,
land and property cases have culminated in a verm-ct by the Supreme Court which
rejected the stand taken by the lower court and the High Court (that is, rejection). So
also the Suprt;me Court has affirmed the verdict of the High Court in 34.2 per cent of
the cases relating to succession and partition, 33.3 per cent of the tenancy, land and
property cases, 29.6 per cent of the contract and money suits, 22.6 per cent of the
cases involving criminal offences and 12.8 per cent of the house rent and eviction
cases. The restoration of the verdict of the lower court has been pronounced in such
issues as contract and money suits (33.3%) house rent and eviction (29.8%),
succession and partition (26.3%) and criminal offences (12.6%).
These findings also testify to the instrumentalism that underlies the recourse to
the legal system, in this instance, to the Supreme Court. More precisely, it can be
postulated that these broad patterns of decision-making by the Supreme Court only
nourish the motivations of litigants, be it the government, individuals, groups or
organisations, to secure their interests through the (Supreme) Court.

6. Judicial delay
The
Supreme
taken by
Supreme

cases examined also provide information regarding the time taken by the
Court to decide a particular case. It is also possible to determine the time
the High Court to decide the cases that have come up in appeal before the
Court.

In 48.8 per cent of the cases the Supremtc Court has taken less than 2 years to
dispose the case. However, in over 35 per cent of the cases, the Supreme Court has
taken about 3 to 6 years, while 10.6 per cent of the cases have taken about 7 to 10
years to be finally disposed. The rest, that is, 3.4 per cent, of the cases have taken
about 11 to 16 years to be finally disposed. Alternatively, it can also be put that over
65 per cent of the cases have taken about 1 to 6 years for final disposal in the
Supreme Court.
In terms of the issues around which these cases revolve, cases relating to
preventive detention are disposed much faster than most other cases. Thus, while 59
per cent of the preventive detention cases were decided in less than one year, 41 per
cent were decided in about 1 to 2 years. Likewise, most of the matters relating to
election, education and constitutional issues have been decided in less than 2 years.
Over 70 per cent of the cases relating to service, house rent and eviction, procedural
issues, company law, compensation,
taxation, hcreditary privileges, government/
bureaucratic actions, revenue and transport have taken less than 4 years for final
disposal. Over 85 per cent of the cases relating to labour and industrial law, criminal
offences and contempt of court have taken about 6 years or less to be decided. So
also, over 80 per cent of the cases relating to succession and partition and nearly 70
per cent of the contract and money suits have taken about 3 to 10 years for final
disposal. While 63 per cent of the lenancy, land and property cases have taken less
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than 4 years, 28.9 per cent· of these (tenancy, land and property) cases have taken
about 5 to 10 years before being finally decided by the Supreme Court.
It must be pointed out that out of the 1118 appeals and special leave petitions
decided by the Supreme Court, the information relating to the time taken by the High
Court to dispose the case could be ascertained in only 781 cases. A majority of these
cases (71.3%) were decided in less than two years by the various High Courts. Also,
24.8 per cent of the cases took about 3 to 6 years to be finally disposed, while 3.6 per
cent had to wait for about 7 to 12 years before the final verdict was pronounced by the
High Court. This only seems to confirm that generally cases are decided faster in the
High Courts than in the Supreme Court.
With regard to the issues connected with the cases examined, cases relating to
prev.entive detention, constitutional issues and election matters are decided much
faster than most other cases by the High Court. Over 83 per cent of the cases relating
to criminal offences, government/bureaucratic
actions, education, transport and
contempt of court and about 70 per cent of the cases relating to labour and industrial
law, service, tenancy, land and property and revenue have been decided in about 2
years. Likewise, 90 per cent of the cases concerning hereditary privileges and over 60
per cent of the cases relating to house rent and eviction, company law, taxation and
procedural issues have taken about 1 to 4 years to be disposed by the various High
Courts. While 51.8 per cent of the contract and money suits were decided in less than
2 years, 37 per cent of these suits took about 3 to 8 years to be disposed by the High
Court. About 65 per cent of the cases relating to succession and partition took about 3
to 8 years to be disposed by the High Court. Over 25 per cent of the cases concerning
company law took about 5 to 10 years.
Notwithstanding the fact that the High Courts decide cases relatively faster than \
the Supreme Court, in absolute terms, the data bear testimony to the oft commented
upon delays in judicial decision-making, both by the Supreme Court and the High
Courts. Where such issues as succession, contract and partition and mo~'ey suits,
tenancy, land and property, criminal offences, taxation, house rent and 'eviction,
government/bureaucratic
actions, service, company law and labour and industrial law
are concerned, the delays associated with the judicial process seem to be much more
perceptible, especially in the Supreme Court.

7. Patterns of consent and dissent
An analysis of the patterns of decision-making
by the Supreme Court is
incomplete without any reference to the patterns of the consent and dissent in the
judgments of the Supreme Court. Broadly, the patterns of consent and dissent refer to
the behaviour of Supreme Court judges in th~ discharge of their adjudicative duties,
and therefore play an important role in any evaluation of the Supreme Court's
functioning. The analysis here is confined to 676 cases where three or more judges sit
in judgment of a particular case.
An overwhelming majority of the judgments (86.7%) in the Supreme Court are
unanimous. However, in 10.2 ver cent of the cases, dissenting judgments (which differ
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as to the ultimate result reached) and in 2.5 per cent of the cases separate opinions
(which concur in the result but for different reasons) have been expressed by-various
judge~,
Dissenting
judgments
were
recorded
in
cases
relating
to
government/bureaucratic
actions, constitutional issues, preventive detention, house
rent and eviction, service, taxation, criminal offences, election and labour and
industrial law. It is important to clarify that the pattern of dissent noticed in the cases
have not drastically altered the outcome o~~<!se (that is, those cases in which a
dissenting opinion was recorded). In other WOfoS, dissent is not organised amongst
the judges but is of an individual nature, often unsupported by the others on the
Bench.
These patterns are thus illustrative of an overwhelming' "judicial consensus" on
issues brought before the Supreme Court. This overwhelming unanimity in the
decisions of the Supreme Court is quite in contrast with the large number of High
Court verdicts being set aside by the Supreme Court as well as the patterns of
uniformity, restoration, rejection, affirmation and disjuncture seen in the above
paragraphs. Indeed, this unanimity in the Supreme Court reinforces a view of the
latter as an integrated agency having absolute powers to review and revise the cases
decided by the various High Courts, lower courts and other quasi-judicial agencies,
and often indulging in patterns of action that seem to fundamentally repudiate these
forums.

8. Summary and discussion
The foregoing analysis is suggestive of certain broad patterns of decision-making
by the Supreme Court. It has been noted that the government, particularly the State
Government, is one of the major litigants in the Supreme Court. While the data is
quite illustrative of the balancing function discharged by the Supreme Court, where it
strives to strike a balance between the "private" claims of individuals, groups and
organisations and the "public" duties devolving upon the government, we also notice a
tendency on the part of the Supreme Court to decide in favour of the government.
The delay associated with the disposition of cases, both by the Supreme Court and the
High Court, has also been noted. Further, certain broad patterns in the decisions
made by the Supreme Court were identified, namely, the large number of appeals
being allowed and the consequent repudiation of the verdict delivered by the High
Court; the patterns of uniformity, rejection, restoration, affirmation and disjuncture in
the decisions rendered, all of which necessarily imply an implicit criticism of the
standards of decision-making by the High Court and the lower courts; and, the
overwhelming unanimity in the judgments of the Supreme Court. These patterns of
decision-making, it has been argued, reinforce the instrumentalism that underlies the
practice of law and the mobilisation of the legal system by litigants. These findings
also reveal that there is more to judicial decision-making than merely applying the law
to a case.
There is a larger question that follows in the wake of this analysis. In a
fundamental sense, the analysis enables us to assess critically the claims underlying
the "rule of law", particularly the assertions about judicial decision-making as based on
legal rules and principles that are autonomous, general and universal. A detailed
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consideration of this question cannot be undertaken here, and must await further
investigation. Nevertheless, an attempt will be made in the brief discussion which
follows to delineate in critical terms the implications of this analysis for the "rule of
law".
The "rule of law" is considered here not as a substantive ideal but as a formal
ideal which posits that "governmental power must be exercised within the constraints
of rules that apply uniformly to general classes of persons or acts".4 Specifically, it
corresponds to Max Weber's formulation of the "formal legal rationality".5 According
to Weber, the formal legal rationality is composed of five principles which, although
noted in our discussion of Weber's sociology of law, are worth repeating here:
... first, that every concrete legal decision be the 'application' of an abstract
legal proposition to a concrete 'fact situation'; second, that it must be
possible in every concrete case to derive the decision from abstract legal
propositions by means of legal logic; third, that the law must actually or
virtually constitute a 'gap less' system of legal propositions, or must, at least,
be treated as if it were such a gapless system; fourth, that whatever cannot be
'constructed' rationally in legal terms is also legally 'irrelevant'; and fifth, that
every sound action of human beings must always be visualised as either an
'application' of legal propositions, or as an 'infringement' thereof ... 6
The results of our analysis amount to a repudiation of these principles. Indeed,
the precise terms in which such a repudiation proceeds is beyond the scope of this
analysis. For, this would necessarily pre-suppose an in-depth analysis of the contents
of the cases examined, the precise nature of the issues involved, the' circumstances of
the appellants/petitioners
and respondents, the legal reasoning as also the notions of
"justice" that underlie a verdict, the complex legal and factual problems involved in
judicial decision-making, and so on. In other words, it would require a detailed sociolegal critique of the Supreme Court, the kind of analysis attempted by, for instance,
Dhavan.7
The broad patterns of decision-making by the Supreme Court identified above
cannot be eXplained in terms of, say, the "truth" of each case or the exercise of
discretionary (review and revision) authority by the Supreme Court, or even the
personality of the judges who decide a case. It may be argued by some that, since the
4.

D.M. Trubek. 'Complexity and C011lradictionin thc Lcgal Order: Balbus and tile Challengc oj
Critical Sacial Thol/ght about Law', La ••' and SocicIYR(~'ie"', Vol. 11. 1977, p. 541.

5.

Roger C5iterrell has rightly noted that "for Anglo-American
lawyers the ideas associated with
Weber's concept of legal domination (and its associated form of legal thought, namely, formal legal
rationality) are reflected most familiarly in' the notion of the 'rule of law'" (see 11le Sociology oj
Law: Anlntrod/lction, Butterworths, London, 1984, p. 1(>8). In this connection, the Anglo-American
roots of lawyers in India may also be noted (see Rajeev Dhavan, 'Bo/TOwedIdcas: Oil the Impact oj
American Scholarship on Indian Law', Amcrican JOl/mal oj Comparatil'e Law, Vol. 33, 1985, pp.
506-26).
Max Weber, Economy and Socicty, edited hy G. Roth and C. Wittich (Berkeley:
University of
California Press, 1978), pp. 657-8.
See Rajeev Dhavan. n,C Suprcme COl/n oj India: ;1 Socio·Lcgal Critiquc oj its Juristic Tcc/miques
(N.M. Tripathi Pvl. Ltd .• Bomhay. 1977). This is not to sidetrack from the limitations of Dhavan\
analysis. which reflects much more his training as a Jurist than as a sociologically inspired scholar.

6.
7.
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Supreme Court is engaged in making decisions not only about actions (the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court) but also about decisions themselves (the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court), the patterns of decision-makirig observed in our
study are an outcome of applying, what Niklas Luhmann has called, "a much more
universal structural principle".8 This may be true. But what is crucial is that the
patterns of decision-making in the Supreme Court connote· the substantive character of
the judicial process, which the "rule of law" as a formal ideal seeks to obscure. In broad
terms, this implies that a judicial decision is not merely a matter of applying a "gapless"
system of rules, but also reflects a whole range of value choices made by judges, lawyers,
and even litigants. Indeed, an in-depth analysis of the contents of the cases examined
would suggest not only the specific interests that are at stake before the Supreme
Court, but would also indicate the specific values that enter into the judicial process.
In the ultimate analysis, the patterns of decision-making exhibited by the
Supreme Court testify to the need to understand the relationship between legal rules
and decisions or, as Trubek9 has pointed out:
"....to what extent are the decisions of government officials, including judges,
made in accordance with pre-existing rules, without regard to other features
of the situation, such as unique characteristics of the parties or the broader
political implications of the outcome?"
It also implies recognising the fact that the rules, those that underlie the decisions of
the judges, are themselves subject to alternative interpretations. All this brings into
sharp focus the problem of defining what is the "legal" in the relations that obtain
among individuals, groups and the government. Any view of judicial decision-making
as being based on legal rules and principles that are autonomous, general and
universal serves to obfuscate the whole host of value choices that are embodied in the
judicial process.

* ** *

8.
9.

See W.T. Murphy, 'Nik/as Luhmallll
Vol. 47, September 1984,p. 615.
Trubek, op. cit., p: 547.
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